ABSTRACT A revocable identity-based encryption (IBE) scheme under learning with error (LWE) assumption from lattice is proposed; compared with the existing IBE schemes from lattices, two improvements are available in the new scheme. First, the revocation mechanism for identity of user (or thing) is added in the new scheme to manage the dynamic user (or thing) identity in the system, and making the IBE scheme from lattice becomes more practical than ever before. Second, the security of the new scheme is based on the LWE assumption from lattice, so our construction has a solid secure foundation. The scheme is proved to be secured against adaptive-ID attacks under LWE assumption from lattice in the standard model.
I. INTRODUCTION
Many problems in the traditional public key cryptosystems may be avoided in the identity-based cryptography such as maintenance, updating and revocation of public key certificates. The identity-based cryptography has fundamentally changed the methods of management and operation of the traditional public key systems. The main difference between identity-based cryptography and public key cryptosystems is that the identity information of a user (or thing) can be used to uniquely identify the user (or thing) in identity-based cryptography, thus the public key of a user(or thing) can be derived from his identity, while in public key cryptography the public key of a user(or thing) has nothing to do with the identity of the user(or thing). So a public key certificate is needed to bind the public key and the identity of the user (or thing). Identity-based cryptography can be used in e-business, e-commerce and e-government, especially for internet of things, etc.
To ensure the security of cryptographic systems especially with a vast number of users (or things), the revocation mechanism is indispensable. A user's (or thing's) identity may be revoked for various reasons. Such as in the case that the user's private key is leaked, or the user is no longer as legitimate user, or suppose that there is an employee who resigned from the company, his identity should be revoked from the system.
Identity revocation was first proposed by Boneh and Franklin [2] , in their scheme the key generation center (KGC) regularly generate private key for every user who hasn't been revoked, and regularly update their private key, this makes KGC workload increase linearly as the number of users increases.
Boldyreva et al. [3] proposed a new method to reduce restrictions on the revocable IBE scheme, they define a framework and a security model for it, the model takes into account the entire adversary's ability in standard security model of IBE, and improves the effectiveness of the previous scheme. By using of the combination of binary tree data structure and fuzzy IBE scheme which is proposed by Sahai and Waters [4] , they construct a RIBE scheme in which the KGC workload increase logarithmically as the number of users increases, the security of the scheme is selective identity secure.
Libert and Vergnaud [7] improved the scheme of Boldyreva et al. [3] . The scheme reached a higher level of security, that is, adaptive identity secure.
As the lattice has become a more favorable tool for cryptographic systems, many lattice-based IBE scheme has been proposed so far, a reasonable explanation is that lattice-based encryption scheme is much easier and more effective to implement. Chen et al. [25] constructed lattice-based RIBE Scheme, by using following three tectonic blocks: IBE Scheme in [1] proposed by Agrawal et al., trapdoor from lattice in [9] proposed by Gentry et al., and binary tree data structure for key update.
In 2013, Su et al. [13] proposed a more effective RIBE Scheme based on the accumulation, the scheme is of adaptive identity security, and the number of update key is of constant size, which is a great improvement for RIBE Schemes.
In 2014, Tsai et al. [15] proposed a public revocation mechanism and defined RHIBE scheme framework with public revocation mechanism. In addition, its security concept formalizes some possible threats. The paper proposed a specific RHIBE scheme by using of bilinear maps, the scheme is based on HIBE scheme proposed by Lewko and Waters [18] with the help of public revocation mechanism. The scheme is constructed by using of the bilinear maps.
In 2016 Wang et al. [22] proposed an efficient lattice-based hierarchical IBE scheme. And Jinman and Qin [23] proposed hierarchical identity-based broadcast encryption scheme on lattices. Wang et al. [24] proposed a full secure IBE scheme with short public key size over lattices. An IBE scheme is also proposed in [27] . A lattice-based identity-based resplittable threshold encryption scheme is proposed in [28] . But in all these schemes the problem that a user may be revoked in the practice has not been properly addressed, so all the scheme is not perfect for practical use, only the scheme in [25] considered the identity revocation problem. But we used a different way to address the revocation problem.
Our contribution
• We construct a revocable IBE scheme from lattice rather than bilinear maps by adding the identity revocation mechanism to lattice-based IBE scheme.
• Our construction is an improvement of the existing IBE Schemes [1, 22, 23, 24, 27, 28] , our scheme has the function of identity revocation, which is indispensable for a IBE scheme in practice as the user may be revoked from the system for various reasons.
• To achieve identity revocation, in our scheme we add the variable time in the system, and the cipher-text and the private key of a user in the system is connected with the variable time. If a user is revoked in time t, the user's private key will not be updated after time t, so the user cannot decrypt the cipher-text after time t.
• We use a random vector u to connect the user identity with time, and the vector u was randomly divided into two vectors u id,1 , u id,2 corresponding to the identity and time respectively. But for a revoked user, he/she cannot get the latest update key which evolves with time.
• The security of the new scheme is based on worst-case lattice problems named Learning with Error (LWE) problem, so our cryptographic construction has a solid secure foundation. As our scheme is based on the lattice so our scheme is much more efficient than that of in [18] which is based on the bilinear maps.
• A comparing of the performance of our scheme with the schemes of [22] - [25] , [27] , and [28] is shown in Table 1 . From the Table 1 we can see that our new scheme and scheme in [25] is of full function. Compared with the scheme in [25] we use a revocation list to address the revocation of the user, while in [25] the authors use a different way of the binary tree revocation technique, so our revocation method is different from that in [25] , and our revocation method is relatively much easier to management.
II. PRELIMINARIES A. INTEGER LATTICES
Definition 1: For a prime q, a matrix A ∈ Z n×m q and a vector u ∈ Z n q , define
Theorem 1 [16] : Let q ≥ 2, n ≥ 1 be integers and m = 2n log q . There is an algorithm TrapGen(q, n) that outputs a pair (A ∈ Z n×m q , T A ∈ Z n×m q ), where T A is a basis for with all but negligible probability in m.
C. ABORT-RESISTANT HASH FUNCTIONS AND ACRONYMS
Definition 2 [1] : Let H = {H : X → Y } denote a family of hash functions, where 0 ∈ Y . For a set of Q inputsx = {x 1 , · · · , x Q } ∈ X Q , the non-abort probability respective to J -place ofx is defined as
where E J (H ) is the event that given J ⊆ {1, · · · , Q},
We call that H is (Q, α J , min , α J , max ) abort-resistant in terms of J -place if for allx = {x 1 · · · , x Q } ∈ X Q with the condition
This paper uses the following definition of abort-resistant hash function family. For a prime q, let (Z
Lemma 4 [1, Lemma 27] : Let q be a prime, 0 < Q < q and J are fixed subset of [Q] . Then for the hash family H defined above satisfies:
q 2 ) abort-resistant in terms of J -place. Definition 3 (Decisional LWE problem [9] ): Consider a prime q, a positive integer n, and a distribution χ ∈ Z q , all public. A decisional Z q , n, χ − LWE problem instance consists of an unspecified challenge oracle O, being, either, a noisy pseudo-random sampler O x carrying some constant random secret key x ∈ Z n q , or, a truly sampler O $ , whose behaviors are respectively as follows.
O x : Output noisy pseudo-random samples of the form
where, x ∈ Z n q is a uniformly distributed persistent secret key that is invariant across invocations. χ i is a freshly generated ephemeral additive noise component with distribute χ, and w i ∈ Z n q is a fresh uniformly distributed vector revealed as part of the output.
O $ : Output truly random samples (w i , v i ) ∈ Z n q ×Z q , drawn in independently uniformly at random in the entire domain Z n q × Z q . The Z q , n, χ − LWE problem statement, or LWE for short, allows an unspecified number of queries to be made to the challenge oracle O, with no stated or prior bound.
We say that an algorithm A decides the
III. SYNTAX OF RIBE A. SYNTAX OF RIBE
Let M , I and T denote the message space, the identity space, and the total number of time period respectively. We treat time t as a discrete variable. More specifically, we divided the life time of the system into T interval (or time period) labeled as 0,. . .,T-1. A RIBE scheme is usually made up of seven probability polynomial time algorithms.
Given the security parameter k with a maximal member number of users N . It outputs a system public parameters PP, a master secret key MK , a user revocation list RL (initially empty), and a system state ST . (
⊥ with overwhelming probability, where ⊥ means termination.
B. SECURITY MODEL OF CIPHER-TEXT INDISTINGUISHABLE AGAINST ADAPTIVE-ID AND CHOSEN PLAINTEXT ATTACK (ind-aID-CPA)
The security model of a RIBE scheme is carried out as a game between an adversary A and a challenger, and the concrete process is as follows: Setup: It is run to generate the public parameters PP, a master key MK, a revocation list RL (initially empty), and a state ST which include user information in the current system. Then PP is sent to the adversary A.
Query 1:A may adaptively ask a polynomial of queries of the following oracles:
-The private key generation oracle PriKeyGen(id), the challenger runs PriKeyGen(PP, MK , id, ST ), the output private key SK id is sent to the adversary A.
-The key update generation oracle KeyUpd(t), the challenger runs KeyUpd(PP, MK , t, RL, ST ), the output key update RL is sent to the adversary A.
-The revocation oracle, the challenger runs, the output update is sent to the adversary.
Challenge: The adversary A outputs the target pair (id * , t * ) and two selected messages m 0, m 1 . The challenger selects a random bit b ∈ {0, 1} and sends the cipher-text CT * = Enc(PP, id * , t * , m b ) to A.
Query 2: The adversary A continues to do queries as in the Query1.
Guess: At the end of the game, the adversary outputs a guess bit b . If b = b, set return = 1, otherwise return = 0. The adversary's advantage is defined as
An RIBE scheme is ind-aID-CPA secure if for all PPT adversaries in the above ind-aID-CPA game, the adversary's advantage Adv RIBE A (λ) is negligible.
IV. OUR CONSTRUCTION
In this section, we give our RIBE scheme. The main idea of our construction is as follows: we use a random vector u to connect the user identity with the time, the vector u is randomly divided into two vectors u id,1 , u id,2 corresponding to the user identity and the time respectively. When the decryption key of the user is generated, two extracted short vectors corresponding to the above two vector u id,1 , u id,2 are generated, which are used as secret key. The first secret key SK id := e id ∈ Z 2m q is connected with user identity id, the second secret key e id,t is connected with time, which is changed with time, and the encrypted cipher-text is also dependent on time. To achieve the revocation, key update mechanism are used, the second secret key is updated with time. But for revoked user, he cannot get the latest update key. Our scheme is forward back secure, that is, if a user is revoked at time, the user will lost the decryption ability for the cipher-text encrypted after time t, but the user still can decrypt the ciphertext encrypted before the time t.
A. CONSTRUCTION 1. setup(1 n , N ). Take as input a security parameter n, and a maximal number of users N , output system parameters q, m, σ, α specified in section 4.3 below, where q is a prime. Let the identity of a user be denoted as id
l 1 , and the lifetime of the system is divided into T time periods labeled 0, 1 · · · , T − 1, let time t denote the time period, and denote it as t = t 1 , · · · , t l 2 ∈ {−1, 1} l 2 , and 0 ≤ t ≤ T − 1, then do the following steps: 1) Use the algorithm TrapGen(q, n) to generate a uniformly random matrix A 0 ∈ Z n×m q with a basis
3) Select a uniformly random vector u ∈ Z n q . 4) Let RL be revocation list of revoked identity, and RL be an empty set initially. Let system stateST be a collection of some user information in the current system, and set ST = ∅ initially.
5) Output ST,RL,the public parameters PP, and the master key MK, 2) Set 
2) Define R as the set of revoked users before time t. Here R is constructed from revocation list RL as follows, for all (id , t ) ∈ RL and t ≤ t, add id to R.
3) For all id / ∈ R, retrieves (id, u id,1 , u id,2 ) from the state ST, sample e id,t ← SampleLeft (A 0 , C t ,T A 0 ,u id,2 ,σ ) 
, and a messagem ∈ {0, 1}, then runs in following steps:
, where
q , z 2 = R T t y ∈ Z m q , and set cipher-text
q }, and a cipher-text CT id,t , if the decryption key and the cipher-text correspond to different identities and times, then output terminator ⊥, otherwise run as following steps: 
{−1, 1} l 2 , revocation list RL, the algorithm add (id, t) to revocation list RL.
B. CORRECTNESS PROOF
The correctness of the scheme is as follows: In the following we will prove that under suitable selecting of the system parameter, the above error term will satisfy
This ensures that our decryption algorithm is correct. 
by lemma 2, and similarly 
So, the boundary of the error term is αq(1 + ω( √ log m))(O((l 1 + l 2 )σ m) + 1).
C. PARAMETERS SETUP
In order to guarantee the correctness of the scheme, the parameters should satisfy:
The error term in the decryption algorithm should less than q/5, that is, α <
For LeftSample Algorithm and RightSample Algorithm, σ is large enough, and satisfies
Regev's reduction process must meet q > 2 √ m/α. To meet the above requirements, the setting parameters are as follows:
4) Modulus q is a prime and satisfies
q > 10 √ m(1 + ω( √ log m))(O((l 1 + l 2 )σ m) + 1).
D. SECURITY PROOF
Theorem 3: Our construction is ind-aID-cPA secure under the (Z q , n,¯ α ) − LWE assumption. Proof: Our proof proceeds with 4 games, the first game is the same as the ind-aID-CPA game in section 3.2 and the adversary has no advantage in last game under the (Z q , n,¯ α ) − LWE assumption. As long as no probability polynomial time adversary A is able to distinguish any two games. In game i, let W i denote the event that the adversary wins the game. That is, the adversary guesses the challenge bit correctly, where i = 1, 2, 3, 4.
Game 0: The game is the ind-aID-CPA game that defines in section 3.2. The challenger selects l 1 + l 2 + 2 random matrixes and generates public parameter PP and master key MK. In challenge phase, the challenger sets the challenge cipher-text CT * = Enc(PP, id * , t * , m b ). Set R * i ∈ {−1, 1} m×m for i = 1, · · · l 1 + l 2 that denote l 1 + l 2 temporary random matrixes in creating cipher-text CT * . Game 1: In this game, the challenger changes the way of generating A i , C j in the public parameters, and selects l 1 + l 2 random scalar h i ∈ Z q for i ∈ {1, · · · , l 1 + l 2 }, then the challenger generates A 0 , B 1 , B 2 like game 0. For i ∈ {1, · · · , l 1 }, j ∈ {1, · · · , l 2 }, we construct matrixes A i , C j as follow: Next, we prove that game 0 and game 1 is statistically indistinguishable by using lemma 1. Note that in game 1 the matrixes R * i ∈ {−1, 1} m×m are used only for construction of A i , C j , CT * , and error terms
, by using lemma 1,
where A i , C j is random and uniform for i ∈ [l 1 ], j ∈ [l 2 ]. Next, let z = (z 1 |z 2 ), by using lemma1, the distribu- C l 2 , z) . Then in the stand of the adversary's view, the matrixes A 0 R i * are statistically the same as uniform and are independent of z, therefore A i , C j as defined in the above equation (1) Game 2: Game 2 is the same as game 1 except that an abort event is added. Let Q (id) be the queries number of private key, and T be the queries number of update key. We suppose that adversary A queries the update key for all time t < |T |, and we assume (t 1 , · · · , tT ) is the time queries tuple, which is listed in an increasing order. The challenger of game 2 does as follows: 1) The setup phase is the same as in game 1, the difference is that the challenger also selects two hash functions H 1 ∈ H 1 , H 2 ∈ H 2 , and keeps them to itself.
2) The challenger replies to the update key queries and submits the challenge cipher-text the same as in game 1.
3) In the game 2, the challenger randomly selects i * ∈ [ T ], and guesses that adversary's i * -th update key query is for time t * . The probability that challenger guesses it correctly is 1/|T |. 4) In the game 2, the challenger guesses one of the two following adversary types:
Type-1 Adversary: A makes private key query for the challenged identity id * , so id * should be revoked before time t * .
Type-2 Adversary: A dose not query private key for the challenged identity id * .
5) The probability that the challenger guesses correctly is 1/2, if the guess is Type-1, the Challenger randomly selects j ∈ [Q (id) ], and suppose that adversary's j − th private key query is for id * , the probability that the challenger guesses it correctly is 1/Q [id] . Let j * = T + j . Let Q = Q [id] + T , in the final phase, the adversary outputs a guess r ∈ {0, 1}. The challenger behaves as following:
T ) is queried time tuple and (id 1 , · · · , id Q (id) ) is the identity tuple respectively. Set
b) Abort check: on input q 1 , q 2 , checks H 1 if satisfies E J 1 (H 1 ), E J 2 (H 1 ), and checks H 2 if satisfies E J 1 (H 2 ). If any condition does not satisfies, the challenger rewrites r with a new random bit in {0, 1} and aborts the games. Note that the adversary does not known H 1 , H 2 , so he does not known if the game ends with an abort. c) Artificial abort: the challenger flips a bit ∈ {0, 1} with Pr[ = 1] = γ (q i ), i = 1, 2, where the detail analysis and the definition of function γ (·) are referenced to [1] . If = 1, the challenger rewrites r with a new random bit {0, 1} in and aborts the games [1] .
Note that the abort condition is decided by hash functions H 1 , H 2 , and they are independent of the adversary's view. For queries tuple q i , i = 1, 2, let ε(q i ) be the probability that an abort event does not happens. Let ε
The above equation denotes the probability that the challenger is correctly guess the type of adversary. If there is no artificial abort, then ε
This is non-negligible and fails to lead to a good lower bound on Pr[W 2 ] − 
Therefore, we have
From the above, Game 1 and game 2 can be distinguish with the negligible advantages. The construction of A i , C j is the same as game 2 for i = 1, · · · , l 1 , j = 1, · · · , l 2 , as follows:
The query of the private key: To reply a private key query for id = {b 1 , · · · , b l 1 } ∈ {−1, 1} l 1 the challenger uses the trapdoor T B 1 , and then runs the following steps:
1) If the identity id is not in state ST, then uniformly random select u id,1 ← Z q n , set u id,2 = u − u id,1 , and store (id, u id,1 , u id,2 ) in state ST, if the identity id is in state ST, retrieval (id, u id,1 , u id,2 ) from ST.
, where H h 1 is the hash function in H wat defined by
3) If h id = 0, abort, and the adversary outputs a bit r ∈ {0, 1} randomly just as in game 2. Else, go to the next step.
q , the distribution of e id is statistically close to
, where F id = A 0 ||A id , and |e id || ≤ σ √ 2m.
5) Output SK id = e id ∈ Z 2m q of identity id and updated state ST.
The query of the update key: To respond an update key query for id = {b 1 , · · · , b l 1 } ∈ {−1, 1} l 1 the challenger b uses the trapdoor T B 1 , and then runs the following steps: 1) Define R as a set consisting of revoked users in time
3) If h t = 0, abort, and the adversary outputs a bit r ∈ {0, 1} randomly just as in game 2. Else, go to the next step. q in time t. For the rest part, the game 3 is the same with the game 2. In the challenge phase, the challenger does the respond as follows.
a) If adversary is type-2, the challenger examines whether
If not, the challenger aborts. b) If adversary is type-1, the challenger examines whether t * = {t 1 , · · · , t l 2 } ∈ {−1, 1} l 2 satisfies
t * i h l 1 +i = 0 and together with id * =
If not, the challenger aborts.
Next, we show that the outputs of SampleRight in game 3 are indistinguishable from the outputs of SampleLeft in game 2. First, we note that the respond to the private key query, since h id is non-zero in step 3 of PriKeyGen, the matrix T B 1 is a trapdoor of h id B 1 . Theorem 3 describes when σ >
, the distribution of the generated short vector e id is close to D u id,1 q (F id ),σ as in game 2 by using T B 1 ≤ O( √ m) in theorem 1. The query process of updating key queries is also similar. Because the game 3 and game 2 is consistent from the perspective of the adversary, the advantage of game 3 is the same as the advantage of game 2.
Game 4: Game 4 is the same as game 3 except that we set the challenge cipher-text (c 0 * , c 1 * ) as a pair of random element in Z q × Z 3m q . As the challenge cipher-text is random, the advantage of game 4 is zero.We will argue game 3 and game 4 is indistinguishable for any PPT adversary.
Reduction from LWE: Given an adversary can distinguish game 3 from game 4 with a non-negligible advantage, we will design an algorithm by using of the adversary to solve LWE problem. The challenger B proceeds as follows:
Instance: B requests samples from O and gets pair (
Setup: B constructs public parameters PP in the following step:
1) Assemble the random matrix A 0 by using the i − th column of A 0 be vector u i for i = 1, · · · , m, where u i from the previously given LWE pair (u i , v i ) ∈ Z n q × Z q . 2) Assign the public random n-vector u = u 0 ∈ Z n q . 3) Construct the public parameters A i , C j , B 1 , B 2 as in game 3 using h i , s i , R i * . Query: B answers the each private key and key update queries as in game 3 include the abort events.
Challenge: When A sends a challenge message bit b * ∈ {0, 1}, a challenge identity and time pair (id * , t * )
. Then B constructs a challenge cipher-text corresponding (id * , t * ), as following: 1) Let v 0 , · · · , v m be entries of LWE samples. 
Second, from the definition of O s we conclude v * = A T 0 s + y, where noise vector y ∈ Z m q is distributed with¯ m α . Therefore, c * 1 defined in step (3) above satisfies When O = O $ we have that v 0 is uniform and independent in Z q and v * is uniform in Z m q . Therefore defined in above step 3) is uniform and independent in Z 3m q . Hence, the challenge cipher-text is uniform in Z q × Z 3m q , just as it is in game 4.
Guess: The adversary guesses that it is a game 3 or game 4 challengers interacting with. The challenger decided to solve LWE problem using the answer of adversary.
Note that when O = O $ the adversary's view is just the same as in game 3. When O = O $ it is the same as in game 4. Hence, the challenger's advantage to solve LWE problem is just the same as the adversary's advantage to distinguish game 3 and game 4.
V. PERFORMANCE ANALYSES
The efficiency of our scheme is compared with the schemes [22] , [24] , [25] , [27] , [28] in Table 2 .
In the tables 2, the meaning of each symbol is illustrated as follows: d is the maximum hierarchical depth, l is the length of the identity information, l 2 is the length of the variable time. From the table 2 we can see the public key space of our scheme is relatively longer compared with the VOLUME 6, 2018 existing schemes, this is because in our scheme we considered both the identity of the user and the variable time, while in other schemes except for scheme [25] the variable time is not involved only the identity of the user is associated with the cipher-text. The cipher-text length of our scheme is in the normal range and it is equals to the length of the cipher-text in the scheme [25] . The efficiency of our scheme is much similar to the scheme in [25] .
VI. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, a revocable identity-based encryption scheme from lattice is proposed in the standard model, and it is proved to be secure against adaptive-ID attacks under LWE assumption. Revocable identity-based encryption scheme from lattice is a new topic, for revocation in our scheme we use the method of revocation list, for other revocation technique such as minimum cover set still need more research works to be done, which will be a good research direction.
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